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A B S T R A C T
Livestock producers adapt their farm management to epidemiological risks in different ways, through veterinary
interventions but also by modulating their farm size and the removal rate of animals. The objective of this
theoretical study was to elucidate how these behavioral adaptations may affect the epidemiology of highly-
pathogenic avian influenza in domestic poultry and the outcome of the implemented control policies. We studied
a symmetric population game where the players are broiler poultry farmers at risk of infection and where the
between-farms disease transmission is both environmental and mediated by poultry trade. Three types of farmer
behaviors were modelled: vaccination, depopulation, and cessation of poultry farming. We found that the
transmission level of the disease through trade networks has strong qualitative effects on the system's epide-
miological-economic equilibria. In the case of low trade-based transmission, when the monetary cost of infection
is high, depopulation behavior can maintain a stable disease-free equilibrium. In addition, vaccination behavior
can lead to eradication by private incentives alone – an outcome not seen for human diseases. In a scenario of
high trade-based transmission, depopulation behavior has perverse epidemiological effects as it accelerates the
spread of disease via poultry trade. In this situation, state interventions should focus on making vaccination
technologies available at a low price rather than penalizing infected farms.
1. Introduction
Behavioral epidemiology – the study of human behavioral responses
to infectious disease circulation – has been receiving an increasing
amount of research attention over the last two decades (Funk et al.,
2010). The behavioral responses of humans to disease can generate
externalities resulting in both positive and negative feedback in the
infection process, justifying the application of different economic the-
ories in the decentralized control of infectious disease. Theoretical ad-
vances in this field have mostly focused on the adoption of voluntary
vaccination programs. The broad consensus is that, because of the effect
of herd immunity, a free market for vaccines is not able to maintain a
disease-free state in any population as long as vaccination has a positive
cost (i.e. either a production cost or a perceived health risk like during
times of vaccine scares) (Geoffard and Philipson, 1997; Bauch and Earn,
2004). Logically the same result holds in livestock systems where
farmers usually incur a positive cost for vaccinating their animals (Rat-
Aspert and Fourichon, 2010). However, private interventions are not
limited to vaccination, and the game-theoretical literature has demon-
strated a variety of possible strategic interactions among actors
depending on the considered behavioral variables and epidemiological
contexts (Hennessy, 2007). For example, players’ interventions aimed
at preventing their own infection or the infection of their animals
(through biosecurity, vaccination, prophylactic treatments, or social
distancing) are strategic substitutes (i.e. a player's incentive decreases
when other players increasingly adopt the same behavior) and, there-
fore, their adoption by players is self-defeating (Reluga, 2010; Sykes
and Rychtár, 2015). On the other hand, actions aimed at preventing the
entry of a pathogen into a disease-free region (through biocontainment,
testing of newly introduced animals, or trade restrictions) or at eradi-
cating a disease at regional or international level may be strategic
complements (a player's incentive increases when other players in-
creasingly adopt the same behavior) and, therefore, their adoption is
self-reinforcing (Hennessy, 2008; Murray, 2014). In this case farmers
can reach a Pareto optimal strategy through coordination. These stra-
tegic properties have important implications for policymakers in
choosing the appropriate state intervention to enhance livestock
owners’ welfare and protecting public health (Barrett, 2004).
Aside from applying veterinary interventions, farmers may mod-
ulate their herd demographic and production structure in response to
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health risks. These adaptations are especially significant in small- and
medium-scale livestock systems of developing countries where farmers
have limited access to veterinary technologies and are less likely to
make long term biosecurity investments due to a limited access to ca-
pital (Hennessy, 2007). A small number of studies have addressed this
question. Focusing on a smallholder farm system with a single decision
maker, Boni et al. (2013) described how farmers may expend or con-
tract their poultry population size to manage an endemic disease. Horan
et al. demonstrated that, in a system of two populations of farmers fa-
cing different incentives for breeding and feeding cattle, the spread of
livestock diseases may, counterintuitively, incentivize a higher trade
activity (Horan et al., 2015), and Tago et al. pointed out the risk of
increased cattle sales in anticipation of cattle movement restrictions
implemented in response to a disease outbreak (Tago et al., 2016).
However, none of these studies considered the possibility that farmers
may apply different sell rates to healthy and sick animals (or batches of
animals). Meanwhile, a growing number of empirical surveys, con-
ducted in developing countries, report that poultry farmers sell or
slaughter their sick birds at a higher rate than their healthy birds, and
that epidemics of severe poultry diseases cause higher-than-normal le-
vels of poultry sales (Zhang and Pan, 2008; Padmawati and Nichter,
2008; Phan et al., 2009; Sultana et al., 2012; Paul et al., 2013;
Delabouglise et al., 2016).
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) is one example of a
zoonotic poultry disease motivating substantial governmental inter-
vention. HPAI outbreaks have occurred regularly in eastern and
southern Asia, Egypt, and West Africa since 2003 (Gilbert et al., 2008;
FAO, 2010, 2014). HPAI has also been reported in Europe and North
America (FAO, 2014). Some avian influenza virus strains of the H5, H7,
and H9 subtypes have the ability to cause severe and fatal disease in
humans. Therefore, poultry originating from farms contaminated with
HPAI are potentially harmful to farmers, consumers, and other persons
handling poultry. While human infections with these subtypes are rare,
their case fatality rates are generally higher than 25% (WHO, 2014). In
addition, the risk that such viruses acquire a phenotype of human-to-
human transmission constitutes a major global health threat and jus-
tifies national-level interventions to reduce the exposure of humans to
infected poultry (Imai et al., 2012). The epidemiology of the disease in
endemic countries is complex, mediated both by direct infectious con-
tact between poultry farms and by the trade of birds carrying the virus
(Desvaux et al., 2011). Since the emergence and global spread of the
H5N1 subtype of HPAI in 2003, interventions have mainly focused on
strengthening avian disease surveillance, preventive culling of domestic
birds in outbreak areas, and restrictions on poultry trade; in addition,
Vietnam and China implemented mandatory poultry vaccination pro-
grams against H5N1 (Sims, 2007; FAO, 2011; Peyre et al., 2009).
In a theoretical model investigating individual responses of poultry
farmers to different policies, the main finding for density-dependent
transmission was that preventive culling of and compensation for
poultry can have perverse effects as it may incentivize an increase in
farm size (higher average poultry price incentivizes more production),
while investments in surveillance, diagnostics, and penalties targeted at
infected farms were found to lower overall health risk (for both fre-
quency- and density-dependent transmission) (Boni et al., 2013). These
findings are in agreement with other economic models describing issues
associated with the indemnification of farms affected by diseases
(Hennessy, 2007; Gramig and Horan, 2011). According to another
economic model, compensation accompanying preventive culling po-
licies should be indexed to the prevention effort invested by farmers
against HPAI (Beach et al., 2007). However, no clear comparisons be-
tween outcomes of targeted penalties and vaccination subsidies were
ever made.
The present study has two purposes. First it aims to describe the
strategic interactions between poultry farmers adapting their farm
management (sales, restocking, turnover, vaccination) to the infection
status of their farm and the population as a whole. The second purpose
is to identify how these strategic interactions affect the outcome of
different HPAI control policies (e.g. penalizing infected farms, sub-
sidizing vaccination). For this purpose we introduce a symmetric po-
pulation game, with broiler poultry farmers as players, and we link this
to a compartmental model of between-flock disease transmission.
Although we use the current knowledge of the economy of small scale
poultry farming systems of southeast Asia and the epidemiology of
HPAI to build our model, our objective here is not to formulate specific
policy recommendations tailored to each country where HPAI is en-
demic. Rather, we aim at demonstrating how farmers’ behavioral
adaptations may affect the outcome of HPAI control policies and how,
as a result, the policy recommendations could be best adapted to dif-
ferent epidemiological and economic contexts of poultry farming.
2. Model
2.1. Description of the system
Our system consists of an large and homogeneous population of
poultry farmers who practice broiler production for earning an income.
We specifically use the small-scale broiler farming systems of Vietnam
as an example, although the results are generalizable to similar systems
found in other countries where HPAI is endemic. Small-scale poultry
farms are considered to play a significant role in perpetuating HPAI
circulation while being the most severely impacted by the disease (ACI,
2006). Farm sizes vary from 50 to 2000 birds. The main bird species
raised in these systems are chickens and ducks. The chicken breeds are
usually a mix of exotic and local breeds with relatively long growing
periods (2.5–4.5 months) and a strong appeal to Vietnamese consumers,
while the duck breeds are mainly exotic ones (Desvaux et al., 2008).
Broiler farmers purchase groups of chicks of equal age (hereafter re-
ferred to as “flocks”) and sell them as finished birds, primarily to itin-
erant poultry traders, after keeping them during a given production
period. Poultry traders sell the purchased poultry, mainly on live bird
markets, to consumers, retailers, or secondary traders and the birds are
slaughtered either by consumers at home or by intermediary actors.
Chicks are mainly supplied by large breeding farms, state-owned farms,
livestock companies, or hatcheries. The revenue from broiler produc-
tion is derived from the sale of finished broilers whose price is de-
termined by their weight at sale (a minor revenue can be obtained from
the sale of manure and feathers but it is neglected here). The cost of
poultry farming is mainly composed of poultry feed production and
purchase (> 70% of the production cost) while expenses for animal
health are usually very low (<4% of the production cost) (Phan,
2013).
We assume that flocks are kept in individual coops on farms. Each
coop can contain one flock and is owned by a single farmer. Broiler
flocks occupying coops are initially disease-free and can be infected in
the course of the growing period if the virus is introduced in the flock.
The disease transmission between coops is modeled but the disease
transmission within coops is not; flocks are simply assumed to be in-
fected or uninfected. Coops lose their infected status at the time of
depopulation, when infected flocks are sold to the traders and replaced
by susceptible flocks. Poultry flocks are always sold but the revenue
generated by a flock depends on both its growing period (which de-
termines poultry weight) and its infection status. If traders notice the
infection in poultry flocks at the time of sale, they apply a penalty on
the sale price. This penalty results from the anticipated reluctance of
consumers to buy infected poultry and from the risk of birds being
seized during sanitary inspections. Note that governmental actions such
as disease surveillance increase the price penalty (i.e. lower the sale
price of infected flocks), as surveillance for HPAI can be used by traders
as an argument for further decreasing the sale price. This penalty can
also be viewed as the cost incurred if a fraction of the birds die from the
disease, whether these dead birds are sold at a very low price or simply
disposed of. Government-initiated flock depopulation (i.e. culling via
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burying or burning) is not considered as an option here. It is assumed
poultry can be sold at any age, sparing the farmer the cost of culling and
disposing of birds. Birds which are either dead, too young or too sick to
be used for human consumption can still be sold as food for pythons,
crocodiles, or fish. However the commercial value of birds strongly
depends on their body weight, and the value of the very young ones is
considered to be close to zero. Farmers can vaccinate their poultry
flocks at an additional cost per coop in order to prevent infection. Coops
with vaccinated flocks are considered to be fully protected. In a disease-
free environment, farmers apply a constant optimal growing period 1,
and σ∅ is the rate of poultry removal (sale) from farms (see
Supplementary Information 1).
2.2. Farm economic model
Farmers are assumed to make rational decisions, to be aware of the
infection status of their poultry flocks and have rational expectations on
their income. Every farmer adapt a set of three farm variables p, v, and
d, all comprised between 0 and 1, to maximize his income. A farmer
will keep a coop populated with poultry with probability p. For a po-
pulated coop, a farmer will vaccinate his flock with probability v. For
an unvaccinated flock, a farmer will depopulate the flock with prob-
ability d in the event that the flock becomes infected. For a depopula-
tion event, we say that the sell rate is σD with σD > σ∅. The rate σD is
chosen by the farmer to be as high as possible since farmers either sell
infected flocks immediately or at a standard sell rate σ∅; any inter-
mediate sell rate is suboptimal (see Supplementary Information 1).
Later we will consider two cases: = 0
D
(infinitely high sell rate),
which allows mathematical tractability, and = 120D , for which numericsolutions will be derived for comparison. Arguably, we could have used
the rate of introduction of new flocks in the farm as a behavioral
variable. However, as we assume that farms are at a steady state
equilibrium, this rate of introduction is fully dependent on p and d.
The income of a given farmer per time period 1 is defined as:= + + +U p v d p vU v dU d U c p p U( , , ) ( (1 )( (1 ) ) ( ¯)) (1 )V D E
(1)
U∅, UD and UV are the revenue per populated coop over a time period
1 where, respectively, status quo (∅), vaccination (V) and fast de-
population of infected flocks (D) are applied. UE is the income earned
from an alternative activity (an income-generating activity farmers can
practice instead of poultry farming), which is considered constant. c p( ¯)
is the production cost incurred by the farmer per coop populated with
poultry per time period 1, which is an increasing function of p¯, the
average of p in the population of farmers. Costs mainly include poultry
feed whose price tend to increase with the total size of the poultry
population as an increasing amount of the agricultural resources are
consumed by farms. For the sake of simplicity, we assume a strict
proportionality between c p( ¯) and p¯:=c p p( ¯) ¯ (2)
with ϵ > 0 a given constant. Using λ as the per-production cycle force
of infection (FOI), the revenues U∅, UD and UV associated with status
quo (∅), vaccination (V) and fast depopulation of infected flocks (D)
are:
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The parameter cP > 0 is the price of a fully-grown flock which is
considered constant (we normalize so that cP=1); cV > 0 is the cost of
vaccination, and γ > 0 is the cost of introducing a new flock in a coop.
λ≥0 is the FOI in the population of coops, i.e. the rate of introductions
of the virus in the coop per production period 1. The function f links
the sell rate to the expected weight at sale. A bird sold after a full
production period 1 has weight one, and as the sell rate approaches
infinity (immediate sale) we consider the bird to have weight zero as it
is too small to be sold for any revenue. The function is detailed in
Supplementary Information 1. The parameter θ≥0 is the price penalty,
the proportion decrease in the sale price of infected flocks.
Letting cP=1, and assuming that infected flocks are sold without
delay =(( / ) 0)D , the expressions (3) simplify to
= += +=
U p v d
p v d
U p v d
U c
1 ( ¯ , ¯,
¯)
1 ( ¯ , ¯, ¯)
1 (1 ( ¯ , ¯, ¯))
1
D
V V (4)
We have made explicit in the above equations that the FOI λ depends on
the population averages of the behavioral variables p v d( ¯ , ¯, ¯). See Fig. 1
for a diagram of the farmer's decision tree and payoffs. Additionally we
assume that 1− γ≥ ϵ > 0 and UE=1− γ− ϵ so that the total op-
portunity cost of poultry production is:+ = +U c p p( ¯) (1 ) ¯E (5)
2.3. Disease transmission in the population of coops
The dynamics of infection among coops are characterized by the
following seven differential equations describing interactions among
susceptible (X) and infectious (Y) coops. XT and YT can be thought of as
the number of susceptible and infected flocks, respectively, currently in
the possession of a poultry trader. The equations below are scaled so
that one unit of time equals 1
= +
= + +
= +
= + +
== + +
= +
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(6)
where= = + = +pv X p v d X Y p v d X Y¯ ¯ , ¯ (1 ¯) ¯ , and ¯ (1 ¯)(1 ¯)V D D
are the fractions of farmers exhibiting vaccination behavior, depopu-
lation behavior, and null behavior, respectively. There is no change in
the XV class as we assume that the vaccine has high enough efficacy to
prevent a coop-level infection.
Two types of disease transmission are considered (Fig. 2). En-
vironmental transmission, or direct transmission from one coop to an-
other, is proximity-based while trade-based transmission occurs
through contacts between farms and trade networks in which infected
poultry are transported, sold and/or slaughtered (Desvaux et al., 2011;
Biswas et al., 2008, 2009; Kung et al., 2007; Fournie et al., 2011). In-
fected flocks are sold to traders at a rate σ∅ (from compartment Y∅) or
σD (from compartment YD) and are kept for a time period T 1 in a “trade
compartment” before being slaughtered. This trade compartment refers
either to the trader's storage place, a wholesale or retail marketplace
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with live birds, or a slaughterhouse. Meanwhile, traders carrying the
virus (on their vehicles, cages, clothes, or boots) may visit other farms
and introduce the virus into susceptible coops. Alternatively poultry
farmers may visit retail marketplaces and subsequently carry the virus
to their farm. Note that we do not consider any disease transmission
inside the trade compartment. The parameter βE is the transmission
coefficient for proximity-based infectious contacts between coops
(scaled to the standard growing period 1), while βT is the transmission
coefficient of contacts between infected flocks in the trade compart-
ment and susceptible coops (scaled to the period T 1 flocks are kept in
the trade compartment).
Trade-based transmission is frequency-dependent as the number of
contacts between populated coops and the trade compartment does not
dependent on the number of populated coops: traders visit a fixed
number of populated coops and farmers visit a fixed number of mar-
ketplaces per time unit irrespective of the poultry population size. As
the number of populated coops increase or decrease, the number of
traders varies accordingly as one trader can only carry a limited number
of poultry per time unit. In this regard, the trade-based transmission can
be compared to a vector-borne disease transmission process where
traders are assimilated to biological vectors carrying the pathogen
(Anderson and May, 1991; Keeling and Rohani, 2008).
On the other hand, environmental transmission is likely to be
proximity-based: the disease is propagated to the neighboring coops
through virus dissemination in flooded areas or scavenging areas shared
by birds of different farms or, alternatively, when farmers visit their
neighbors and carry the virus on their boots or clothes. Therefore, an
infected coop has a higher probability of transmitting the disease if the
number of populated coops in its neighborhood is increased. In the
remainder of the manuscript this transmission pathway is therefore
assumed to be density-dependent. In order to test the robustness of the
results to this hypothesis, a separate analysis assuming frequency-de-
pendent environmental transmission was conducted and its results are
displayed in the Supplementary Information.
Note one unusual feature of the construction of these equations. A
very high rate σD (fast exit from the YD class) translates to a large value
of YT and rapid re-entry into the YD class. In other words, σD does not
behave like a true recovery term; rather, it represents a transfer of the
Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the farmer's decision process and associated incomes for the four management behaviors.
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infection from the farmer's coop to the trader.
The dimensionality of the system can be reduced as susceptible plus
infected coops will always add up to the number of farmers practicing a
particular behavior. Note that the basic reproduction ratio of the dis-
ease, when = =p v¯ 1, ¯ 0 and =d¯ 0, is R0= βE+ βT. In general it is
assumed to be higher than unity (βE+ βT > 1).
The assumption (σ∅/σD)= 0 allows us to derive a simplified ex-
pression for the FOI at endemic equilibrium, denoted ˆ, for any parti-
cular population behavioral profile described by p¯, v¯, and d¯. If+ <v p d(1 ¯)( ¯ (1 ¯) ) 1E T , the basic reproduction rate in the system
is less than one and =ˆ 0. If + >v p d(1 ¯)( ¯ (1 ¯) ) 1E T and<v d(1 ¯) ¯ 1T , then we have
= +v p d
v d
ˆ (1 ¯)( ¯ (1 ¯) 1)
1 (1 ¯) ¯
E T
T
which is the equilibrium FOI when the combined reproduction number
from trade and environmental transmission is larger than one. When
both + >v p d(1 ¯)( ¯ (1 ¯) ) 1E T and >v d(1 ¯) ¯ 1T , the reproduc-
tion number approaches infinity and all coops are infected (see details
in Supplementary Information 2). If the between-coop environmental
disease transmission is assumed to be frequency-dependent rather than
density-dependent then the FOI is not affected by p¯ but the dynamics of
the FOI with respect to the two other behavioral variables (v¯ and d¯)
remains unchanged (see details in Supplementary Information 3).
2.4. Game theory equilibria
Players (farmers) are assumed to optimize a strategy =s p v d( , , )
comprising three behavioral variables, whose utilities are dependent on
the population variable p v dˆ ( ¯ , ¯, ¯) which, in turn, is determined by the
population-average strategy =s p v d¯ ( ¯ , ¯, ¯) (Table 1). Players are assumed
to change their strategy at defined time steps separated by a sufficiently
long period to allow an epidemiological equilibrium to be reached and
maintained (i.e. we ignore the effects of transient epidemiological dy-
namics on farmers’ choices). Farmers adapt their strategy by comparing
the income earned from behaviors ∅, V and D, which can be done by
observation of other farms and information exchange among farmers;
this does not necessarily require a precise knowledge of the FOI. Since
farmers’ income expectations are assumed to be rational, the general
principles for Nash equilibria in symmetric population games are ap-
plicable to our system. More specifically, we refer to Thomas's criteria
(Thomas, 1984) to identify evolutionary stable population strategies: a
given set of behavioral variables =s p v d* ( *, *, *) is a local evolutionary
stable strategy if and only if for every small neighborhood N(s*) of s*,
we have = =r N s U r s s U s s s( *), ( |¯ *) ( *|¯ *) (7)
= < =r N s U r s r U s s r( *), ( |¯ ) ( *|¯ ) (8)
Condition (7) is the definition of a Nash equilibrium while (8) is the
condition of stability, wherein an evolutionary stable strategy cannot be
invaded by a different strategy applied by a sufficiently small minority
of players.
The endemic equilibrium ˆ is associated with different payoffs for
each of the four options of keeping an empty coop, vaccinating, de-
populating, and null behavior (i.e. keeping unvaccinated flocks and
raising them to full growth irrespective of infection status) (Table 1). As
the four options can be described by three degrees of freedom, we will
Fig. 2. Schematic representation of the flow of flocks and the between-coop disease transmission process. Coops managed with behavior D displace their infected
flocks to the trade compartment at a higher rate than coops managed with behavior ∅ and, as a result, introduce new flocks at a higher rate.
Table 1
System variables.
Notation Meaning
p¯ Proportion of coops populated with poultry
v¯ Proportion of populated coops where vaccination is applied (behavior V)
d¯ Proportion of populated unvaccinated coops where depopulation is
applied in case of infection (behavior D)
U∅ Income earned from a populated coop with behavior ∅
UV Income earned from a populated vaccinated coop (behavior V)
UD Income earned from a populated unvaccinated coop where depopulation
is applied in case of infection (behavior D)
^ Equilibrium force of infection
s p v d¯ ( ¯ , ¯, ¯) Population-average strategy (or system state) composed of p¯, v¯ and d¯
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use the notation p v d( , , ). We denote the Nash-equilibrium FOI as ˆ*. In
general, the asterisk will be used to refer to a stable Nash equilibrium.
According to the principles of dynamic game theory, the stability of
a mixed strategy s* is dependent on the linear stability of the following
system of differential equations:= + +p s p p vU v dU s d U s c p U¯ (¯) ¯ (1 ¯)( ¯ (1 ¯)( ¯ (¯) (1 ¯) (¯)) ( ¯) )V D E
(9)= +v s v v U dU s d U s¯ (¯) ¯ (1 ¯)( ( ¯ (¯) (1 ¯) (¯)))V D (10)
=d s d d U s U s¯ (¯) ¯ (1 ¯)( (¯) (¯))D (11)
Eqs. (9)–(11) are the replicator equations of the game for poultry
farming, vaccination and depopulation behavior respectively (Taylor
and Jonker, 1978; Cressman and Tao, 2014). They show that poultry
farming (i.e. keeping coops populated with poultry), behaviors V
(vaccination) and D (depopulation) are increasingly adopted (i.e. im-
plemented with a higher probability) as long as they are expected to
return a higher income than their competing choice.
Note that in a disease-free environment and without vaccination the
revenue per populated coop is equal to 1− γ and the farmers are ex-
pected to keep p¯ at one (all coops are populated with poultry). Indeed
when =p¯ 1 then 1− γ− c(1)=UE (the income from poultry farming
equals the income from its alternative) while if <p¯ 1 then
1− γ− c > UE which incentivizes the population of additional coops
with poultry. Conversely, if the revenue per populated coop drops to
zero, p¯ is expected to drop to zero (all farmers invest in the alternative
activity and keep their coops empty). It is assumed here that ϵ is close
enough to 1− γ so that some coops are kept populated even when the
average revenue per populated coop is very low.
2.5. Parameters used in the analysis
Parameters used for the analysis are displayed in Table 2. They are
mostly derived from the literature on small-scale poultry production in
Vietnam (ACI, 2006; Burgos et al., 2008; Desvaux et al., 2008; Phan
et al., 2009, 2013a; Fournie et al., 2012; Delabouglise et al., 2016,
2019).
Some critical parameters cannot be easily quantified. The penalty
parameter θ may vary considerably. It will depend on the level of dis-
ease transmission and disease severity in the flock, which in turn de-
pends on the viral strain, poultry species, and concomitant infections
with other pathogens. The size of the penalty also depends on decisions
by traders on the reduction of the price paid for infected flocks, which
may vary from 17% to 67% of the flock value (Delabouglise et al.,
2016). The disease is considered to be most severe in chickens, espe-
cially in densely populated coops (with some reported mortality rates
higher than 50%) and may be comparatively mild in ducks and other
waterfowl species, in which some HPAI strains are low pathogenic
(Hulse-Post et al., 2005; OIE, 2009). The cost of vaccination is also
variable. While a vaccine dose itself has low cost (0.05–0.1 USD/dose),
the technical training, labor, and storage facility required to implement
vaccination against avian influenza may represent a high investment for
small-scale farmers. Additionally, vaccination used in isolation provides
little protection because the circulating avian influenza strains are ge-
netically diverse and high exposure of poultry to other pathogens un-
dermines their immune response to the vaccine. It is usually believed
that effective vaccine protection can be obtained only if combined with
the implementation of a good farm hygiene, regular disinfection, and
biosecurity practices (Peyre et al., 2009; McLeod et al., 2007). In regard
to this constraint, we considered a broad range of values for the vac-
cination cost cV (0–25% of the flock commercial value).
To the best of our knowledge the transmission parameters βE and βT
were never quantified. We considered arbitrarily that the basic disease
reproduction ratio (with = =p v¯ 1, ¯ 0 and =d¯ 0), is
R0= βE+ βT=2.5, i.e. an infected coop in a population of fully Ta
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susceptible non vaccinated coops may infect 2.5 other coops. The main
purpose of the analysis is to analyse the effect of the respective con-
tribution of environmental and trade-based transmission (βE and βT) on
the game theoretical equilibrium.
3. Results
3.1. Strategic interactions
Farmers’ individual poultry management choices have clear effects
on the system's epidemiology. In general, because of density depen-
dence built into the model, an increase in vaccination uptake v( ¯) or a
decrease in the number of populated coops (i.e. poultry population size)
(p¯) leads to a lower FOI. The effects of wider adoption of depopulation
behavior (d¯) are not as easily predicted, as they depend on βT and v¯. The
reason is that populated coops managed with behavior D are not likely
to contaminate other coops through environmental transmission be-
cause their infectious period is short; however, these coops relay all of
their incoming infections into the trader network, and therefore sell a
higher absolute number of infected flocks than coops managed with
behavior ∅. As a result, as d¯ increases, susceptible coops are less likely
to be contaminated through environmental transmission from neigh-
boring farms and are more likely to be contaminated through contacts
with poultry traders. The effect of d¯ on ˆ can be positive or negative
depending on the values of βT and v¯, as illustrated in Fig. 3. If> v1/(1 ¯)T , the FOI ˆ is positively associated with d¯, as the level of
trade-based transmission in this scenario is high enough that we ob-
serve more depopulation leading to more infection in the trading
network and thus a higher force of infection. In other words, in systems
where pathogen circulation can be maintained through trade, adoption
of behaviour D generates negative externalities as the FOI increases via
the trade of infected birds. If < v1/(1 ¯)T , the FOI ˆ is negatively
associated with d¯ as the intrinsic level of trade-based transmission is not
high enough to maintain an endemic level of infection in the current
vaccination environment; in this case, adopting depopulation behavior
has a larger effect on lowering environmental transmission and a
smaller effect on increasing trade-based transmission (see Supplemen-
tary Information 4).
The effect of the epidemiological environment on farmer choice can
be described similarly. As a general rule, a high FOI tends to favor
vaccination and emptying coops, while a low FOI favors depopulation.
At high FOI, depopulation behavior is very costly as farmers would
have to repeatedly depopulate and reintroduce healthy flocks to
maintain their farm size; in other words, it is worth foregoing the
revenue of infected flocks and replacing them early with susceptible
flocks only if subsequent new flocks have a sufficiently low risk of being
infected. Vaccination and emptying coops are both effective ways of
limiting income losses due to the disease when the FOI is high. Indeed,
vaccination substantially increases the flock value by avoiding a likely
infection while keeping a coop empty limits farm costs and allows in-
vesting the saved expenses in a more profitable activity. When the FOI
is low (and the penalty on infected flocks is sufficiently high) depopu-
lation is a profitable strategy as a re-stocked healthy coop is unlikely to
become reinfected. However, vaccination is an expensive ways of en-
suring that an unlikely infection event will not occur and keeping the
coop empty may be a suboptimal choice when poultry farming returns a
Fig. 3. Effect of farmers’ behavior on the force of infection and feedback effect on the behavioral dynamics. Color bars correspond to the quantity shown above each
panel. Left, middle and right panels show changes in the FOI, v¯ , and d¯ in the two-dimensional space v d( ¯, ¯). White areas indicate a disease-free state. Top: βT=0.8.
Bottom: βT=1.2. Other parameters are: = = = = = =c p2.5 , , 0.25, 0.1, 0.13, ¯ 1E T
D V
1
20 . The effects of varying the p¯ variable are displayed in
Supplementary Information 4. In the left panels, contours correspond to values 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the FOI. In the middle and right panels, contours correspond to =v¯ 0
and =d¯ 0 respectively. Black circles and white circles are, respectively, stable and unstable Nash equilibria (assuming p¯ is constant). (For interpretation of the
references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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high revenue.
3.2. Stable Nash equilibria
The system allows five types of stable Nash equilibria, summarized
in Table 3, that are present at different transmission levels, different
vaccination costs, and different values of the price penalty (θ) on in-
fected flocks (see derivation in Supplementary Information 5). There is
a substantial qualitative difference between poultry producer commu-
nities where poultry trade alone cannot sustain viral circulation
(βT < 1) (Fig. 4) and those where it can (βT > 1) (Fig. 5). We refer to
the systems with βT > 1 as systems with “trade-maintained en-
demicity”. This result is robust to the nature of the between-coop en-
vironmental transmission (frequency-dependent or density-dependent)
as shown in Supplementary Information 6. The Nash equilibrium mixed
strategy (p*, 0, d*) allowing endemicity is always unstable in the ab-
sence of trade-maintained endemicity and can be stable in case of trade-
maintained endemicity, given a high enough penalty (see demonstra-
tion in Supplementary Information 5). When trade-maintained en-
demicity is absent (βT < 1), the expansion of the depopulation beha-
vior establishes a stable disease-free equilibrium at (1, 0, d*). These
differences are linked to the natures of the externalities of behavior D
under different epidemiological settings. If βT > 1 and the vaccination
coverage is low, increasing d¯ always increases the FOI, making behavior
D self-defeating. In the absence of trade-maintained endemicity, de-
population behavior in the population is self-reinforcing: as d¯ increases,
the FOI drops, and the payoff to the depopulation strategy increases as
it becomes less likely that a farmer's subsequent flock will experience
infection. This explains the bistability and hysteresis observed in the
system with respect to changes in the penalty (Fig. 4).
Since vaccination behavior is self-defeating (vaccines cause lower ˆ
which increases the payoff of other behaviors U∅ and UD as compared
with UV), a mixed strategy p v( *, *, 0) may stabilize when the vaccina-
tion cost cV is sufficiently low (see demonstration in Supplementary
Information 5). As demonstrated in previous theoretical analyses of
private incentives for vaccination (Geoffard and Philipson, 1997; Bauch
and Earn, 2004), vaccination alone cannot maintain a disease-free state
( p v( *, *, 0) is never a disease-free equilibrium unless cV=0). However,
in the farm management model considered here, the decrease of FOI
due to vaccination of a fraction of the coops incentivizes the depopu-
lation of unvaccinated infected coops, provided the penalty is suffi-
ciently high and the vaccination cost sufficiently low. In the absence of
trade-maintained endemicity, this synergistic effect between vaccina-
tion and depopulation leads to and maintains a disease-free state as the
presence and incentivization of the depopulation behavior among non-
vaccinators breaks the transmission chain (Fig. 4C). Thus, vaccination
leads to disease eradication by private incentives alone. In case of trade-
maintained endemicity a mixed strategy p v( *, *, 1) may stabilize
(Fig. 5) as both V and D are self-defeating (see demonstration in Sup-
plementary Information 5). This mixed strategy where every farmer
adopts some disease intervention method does not lead to disease
eradication as the depopulators maintain the infection in the population
by propagating the disease solely through the poultry trade network
while benefiting from the lower FOI due to a proportion v* of farms
practicing vaccination.
3.3. Effect of targeted penalties on Nash equilibria
The price penalty on infected flocks only affects the revenue of
farmers with the null behavior ∅ (see the set of Eqs. (4) and Fig. 1).
This implies that the utility of the null behavior U∅ decreases relative
to the utility of the two other behaviors UD and UV when the targeted
penalty increases, resulting in different types of stable Nash equilibria.
The equilibrium outcome of the game can be neatly characterized
by three natural threshold values of the price penalty θ (see Figs. 4A
and 5 A). When θ is below both
= ++c c c( )( 1)V V E T V EE T V E (12)
and
= + ++( )D E T EE (13)
in the strategic environment (p, 0, 0) the null behavior has a higher
payoff than vaccination and depopulation (U∅ > UV and U∅ > UD),
making this strategy a stable Nash equilibrium. Since U∅ depends on θ,
increasing the penalty θ under the Nash equilibrium s*= (p*, 0, 0)
disincentivizes the populating of coops with poultry (i.e. decreases p*)
and, in turn, moderately decreases the FOI (Figs. 4 and 5). ˆ* is the
unique positive solutions of:
+ + + =ˆ 2 ˆ ( 1) 0E T E T E2 (14)
When θ > θV, this is the exact condition when vaccination returns a
higher payoff than the null behavior in the (p, 0, 0)-environment, and
the (p*, 0, 0) strategy becomes unstable; the mixed strategy p v( *, *, 0)
stabilizes as V behavior is self-defeating (Fig. 4B and C). When θ > θD,
this is the exact condition when the strategy (p, 0, 0) is able to be in-
vaded by the depopulation behavior (UD > U∅ in the strategic en-
vironment (p, 0, 0)). The resulting stable Nash equilibrium depends on
βT. In case of trade-maintained endemicity, D is self-defeating and (p*,
0, d*) stabilizes (Fig. 5D and E) while in the absence of trade-main-
tained endemicity D is self-reinforcing, the strategy (1, 0, d*) stabilizes
and maintains a disease-free equilibrium (Fig. 4D and E). This disease-
free (1, 0, d*) strategy is stable for any value of price penalty θ > γ.
The targeted penalty may be raised above a third threshold= +cVVD (15)
above which the null behavior achieves the lowest utility among the
three behaviors at the currently stable Nash equilibrium. In a p v( , , 0)
strategic environment depopulation behavior D is able to invade
(UD > UV=U∅). In the presence of trade-maintained endemicity and
a (p, 0, d) strategic environment, vaccination behavior V invades
(UV > UD=U∅). Again, the resulting stable Nash equilibrium depends
Table 3
Nash equilibria.
Notation Behaviors present Force of infection Transmission settings Description
(p*, 0, 0) ∅ See Eq. (14) All Pure strategy of null behavior, where no vaccination or depopulation is practiced; stabilizes when
price penalty is low enough and/or vaccination cost is high enough
p v( *, *, 0) V, ∅ =ˆ* cVcV All Mixed strategy of vaccinating and null behaviors; may stabilize if vaccination cost is low enough
p v( *, *, 1) V, D =ˆ* cV βT > 1 Mixed strategy of vaccinating and depopulation; stabilizes when price penalty is high enough and
vaccination cost is low enough
(p*, 0, d*) D, ∅ =ˆ* 1 βT > 1 Mixed strategy of depopulation and null behaviors; stabilizes when price penalty is high enough
(1, 0, d*) D, ∅ =ˆ* 0 βT < 1 Mixed strategy where the presence of depopulation behavior keeps the basic reproduction number
below one
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on βT. In the absence of trade-maintained endemicity D is self-reinfor-
cing while V is disincentivized by the lowering of FOI due to the ex-
pansion of behavior D in the farmers’ population and (1, 0, d*)
stabilizes and maintains a disease-free equilibrium. In case of trade-
maintained endemicity, D and V are both self-defeating and a mixed
strategy p v( *, *, 1) stabilizes. Under this stable Nash equilibrium
p v( *, *, 1) the high penalty and low vaccination cost guarantee that
Fig. 4. Stable farmer strategies and resulting force of infection when βT < 1.
(A) Predicted stable equilibrium strategies in response to given sets of policy-
dependent parameters (vaccination cost, penalty) (shaded areas are bistable
Nash equilibria). Middle (B and D): evolution of the equilibrium force of in-
fection ( ˆ*) in response to varying the penalty when vaccination cost is low
(cV=0.04) (panel B) and high (cV=0.25) (panel D), with (σ∅/σD)= 0 and
(σ∅/σD)= 0.05 (computed numerically). Bottom (C and E): evolution of the
equilibrium behavioral variables in response to varying penalty when vacci-
nation cost is low (cV=0.04) (panel C) and high (cV=0.25) (panel E), with
(σ∅/σD)= 0. Parameter values are: βT+ βE=2.5, βT=0.9, γ=0.1 and
ϵ=0.7. When vaccination is too expensive, increasing the penalty makes the
system transit through, successively, an endemic state with pure ∅ behavior
strategy, a bistable equilibrium with either pure ∅ or disease-free (with a high
proportion of depopulators), and a unique disease-free state. When vaccination
cost is low intermediate values of the penalty result in a mixed strategy of null
behavior and vaccination (V, ∅). A sufficiently low vaccination cost can es-
tablish a disease-free equilibrium.
Fig. 5. Stable farmer strategies and resulting force of infection when βT > 1.
(A) Predicted stable equilibrium strategies in response to given sets of policy-
dependent parameters (vaccination cost, penalty). Middle (B and D): evolution
of the equilibrium force of infection ( ˆ*) in response to varying penalty when
vaccination cost is low (cV=0.04) (panel B) and high (cV=0.25) (panel D),
with (σ∅/σD)= 0 and (σ∅/σD)= 0.05 (computed numerically). Bottom (C and
E): evolution of the equilibrium behavioral variables in response to varying the
penalty when vaccination cost is low (cV=0.04) (panel C) and high (cV=0.25)
(panel E), with (σ∅/σD)= 0. Parameter values are: βT+ βE=2.5, βT=1.1,
γ=0.1 and ϵ=0.7. Increasing the penalty when vaccination is too expensive
makes the system transit from an endemic stable equilibrium where farmers
implement the null behavior as a pure strategy to another endemic stable
equilibrium where farmers implement a mixed strategy of (D, ∅); at this new
equilibrium the force of infection increases when the penalty increases. If the
penalty crosses the threshold cV+ γ, farmers settle into a (D, V) mixed strategy
and the disease remains endemic.
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UD=UV > U∅. All farmers being either vaccinators or depopulators,
their revenue is not affected by the price penalty and the system is
irresponsive to further changes in θ (Fig. 5B and C).
3.4. Policy implications
Our results reveal a substantial qualitative difference between
poultry producer communities where poultry trade alone cannot sustain
viral circulation (Fig. 4) and those where it can (Fig. 5). Resulting
policy considerations are summarized in Table 4. When trade-main-
tained endemicity is absent, the incentives created by a sufficiently high
penalty on infected poultry allow the depopulation strategy to establish
and maintain a disease-free equilibrium. Regions with bistability, in-
dicated in Fig. 4, can be seen as cases of coordination games where
players are either applying a suboptimal strategy (either s*= (p*, 0, 0)
or =s p v* ( *, *, 0)) or an optimal strategy s*= (1, 0, d*).
In practice, every system needs to be analyzed in its own economic
detail to determine which behaviors are likely to stabilize. In Figs. 4 and
5, θD is close to 0.23, i.e. 23% of the flock value. For some types of
farms, the penalty on a flock's commercial value can be above θD if, for
example, the mortality induced by HPAI is higher than 50%, even if we
take into account the possibility of selling dead birds. This would be
true for large flocks of chickens in densely-populated coops where HPAI
spreads easily (we refer to this type of farm as “severely affected”).
Farms of this type face strong incentives for early depopulation (D)
regardless of the implemented policy. In other production types, the
disease and morbidity impact of HPAI may be milder, especially in duck
flocks (θ < 0.1), and we refer to this type of flock as “mildly affected”.
Farms of this latter type would be unlikely to adopt depopulation or
vaccination in the absence of specific government policy aimed at in-
creasing the penalty θ and/or decreasing the vaccination cost cV.
In the absence of trade-maintained endemicity, severely affected
farms are unlikely to perpetuate the infection as they depopulate their
infected coops early, cutting short the environmental transmission
chain of the virus. In this case, to improve social welfare, policymakers
may aim at establishing the depopulation behavior D in the population
of mildly affected farms. They may do so by temporarily enforcing very
high targeted penalties (θ > θD) (with enhanced surveillance or sani-
tary control on sold birds) or by temporarily combining an increase in
the targeted penalty with financial subsidies on vaccination (θ > θVD).
These subsidies on vaccination do not need to be maintained on the
long term as the disease-free equilibrium s*= (1, 0, d*) can be sus-
tained provided the penalty on infected flocks is maintained above γ
(10% of the flock value here).
In the presence of trade-maintained endemicity, however, depopu-
lators generate perverse epidemiological effects in the presence of low
vaccination coverage (low v¯) and severely affected farms may amplify
the virus circulation by depopulating their infected coops. In this sce-
nario, increasing the penalty may have a perverse effect, as under the
equilibrium s*= (p*, 0, d*), ˆ* is positively correlated with θ=( ˆ* ( / ) 1). By concentrating all public efforts on targeted penalty
enforcement, policymakers run the risk of increasing the FOI and re-
ducing poultry production (Fig. 5D and E). Decreasing the cost of
vaccination is the only policy approach that is guaranteed to have
beneficial public health effects and maintain a high level of poultry
production (see Fig. 5B and C): for a sufficiently low vaccination cost,
one of the mixed strategies =s p v* ( *, *, 0) or =s p v* ( *, *, 1) stabilizes
and the equilibrium FOI ˆ* and the penalty θ are negatively correlated
or independent respectively; in both cases, ˆ* is positively correlated
with the vaccination cost (Table 3), confirming the beneficial effect of a
subsidy on vaccines. However, under trade-maintained endemicity,
none of the three stable (mixed) strategies =s p v* ( *, *, 0), s*= (p*, 0,
d*) or =s p v* ( *, *, 1) is associated with a disease-free equilibrium.
4. Discussion
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first one to investigate
the effect of varying the timing of harvest of infected livestock and
disease transmission through animal trade networks from a theoretical
epidemiological-economic perspective. It represents are a significant
theoretical departure from the previous applications of game-theory to
epidemiological systems which have mainly focused on private disease
management interventions which are strategic substitutes with positive
externalities (vaccination, social distancing, farm biosecurity) (Geoffard
and Philipson, 1997; Bauch and Earn, 2004; Reluga, 2010; Hennessy,
2007). Such interventions are unlikely to maintain a disease-free
equilibrium. Here, we demonstrate that with low levels of trade-based
disease transmission, it is possible, by incentivizing either depopulation
alone or a combination of depopulation and vaccination, to establish a
disease-free equilibrium which can be sustained in the long run.
However, with high levels of trade-based disease transmission, the
disease cannot be eradicated as growing adoption of depopulation be-
havior increases the FOI. Vaccination does reduce transmission in this
scenario, but the lower overall FOI caused by increased vaccination
leads to depopulators free-riding on this lower FOI, resulting in an in-
crease of the FOI in the network of traders specifically. As a result, the
depopulation behavior cannot be avoided because it has high utility
when the FOI is low enough (but not zero), which prevents disease
eradication when βT > 1.
The relevance of the game-theoretical stability to epidemiological-
economic systems relies on the assumption of perfect mobility of
players: it is assumed that in the long run, actors initially implementing
a suboptimal strategy either switch to the optimal one (through adap-
tation or imitation) or quit the poultry farming industry. This as-
sumption might hold in the context of poultry farming in Vietnam and
most developing countries, as they are characterized by limited in-
stitutional regulation and few barriers to entrance and exit of the sector
(ACI, 2006; Hong Hanh et al., 2007; Burgos et al., 2008). Note that, as
the system is subject to the economic and ecological changes affecting
disease dynamics (fluctuation in market prices and climatic variables)
(Delabouglise et al., 2017), stable equilibria remain theoretical and
should be interpreted as states towards which the system tends to
converge.
Avian influenza is ultimately not eradicable at the global level be-
cause it has an enzootic reservoir in wild birds which cannot be man-
aged by actors of the poultry industry (Gilbert et al., 2006). However,
Table 4
Policy recommendations.
Policy aspects βT < 1 βT > 1
Establishment of a disease-free equilibrium
through private incentives
Possible, by enforcing targeted penalties, decreasing
vaccine costs or both
Impossible unless vaccination has no cost
Effect of targeted penalties Generate beneficial public health effects, reduce
disease incidence, establish a disease-free equilibrium
High penalties can increase the force of infection through trade. They must
be associated with low cost vaccination to avoid this adverse effect.
Effect of low vaccine costs Generate beneficial public health effects, reduce
disease incidence, help establish a disease-free
equilibrium
Always have beneficial effects, reduce disease incidence but do not
maintain a disease-free equilibrium
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provided the rate of virus re-introduction from the wild-bird reservoir
into the considered farming community is sufficiently low, the identi-
fied disease-free epidemio-economic equilibrium remains stable since
the depopulation behavior of a sufficiently high proportion of farmers
keeps the pathogen reproduction ratio below one. Any virus introduc-
tion is thereby unable to generate an epidemic in the population of
domestic birds. Therefore, the eradication results in our analysis are
applicable to areas where poultry farming is common, but not to gen-
eral avian influenza circulation in wild bird populations.
These results highlight the importance of trade-based disease
transmission and modulation of the timing of sale – two real-life fea-
tures of smallholder livestock systems – on the epidemiological-eco-
nomic equilibria of avian influenza circulating in a network of profit-
maximizing farmers. The economic context of poultry farming in some
endemic countries is favorable to depopulation in response to disease
infection: chicks and finished poultry are traded with limited equip-
ment (motorcycle for transportation, storage of poultry at home or in
enclosures of live bird markets) (Van Kerkhove et al., 2009; Fournie
et al., 2012; Phan, 2013) which limits transaction costs associated with
the sale and introduction of flocks. Moreover, the limited sanitary
controls and the flexibility of the trade networks allow the sale of sick
and/or young birds and their use for human consumers or by other
livestock farms (python, crocodile, fish) (Sultana et al., 2012; Paul
et al., 2013; Phan et al., 2013a; Delabouglise et al., 2016; Nguyen et al.,
2017). The depopulation behavior could partly explain why avian in-
fluenza viruses of the H5 subtype are more likely isolated from poultry
sampled in live bird markets (Phan et al., 2013b; Nguyen et al., 2014;
Turner et al., 2017) than in poultry farms (Henning et al., 2011;
Desvaux et al., 2013; Thanh et al., 2017). Several epidemiological in-
vestigations suggested contacts with poultry traders or live bird markets
increase the risk of farm infections with H5N1 HPAI (Desvaux et al.,
2011; Biswas et al., 2008, 2009; Kung et al., 2007). A time series
analysis showed the contribution of time variation of trade activity to
the seasonality of HPAI H5N1 (Delabouglise et al., 2017). Spatial
analyses conducted in Indonesia and China also showed that proximity
to trade networks is a risk factor of H5N1 HPAI reporting (Fang et al.,
2008; Loth et al., 2011). Among factors contributing to infection from
trade-based transmission are the high frequency of trader visits to
poultry farms and the lack of cleaning and disinfection of traders’ ve-
hicles and equipment.
In order to effectively design disease control policies, it is crucial to
elucidate the respective contributions of trade-based and environmental
transmission in the circulation of endemic poultry diseases. In the ab-
sence of trade-maintained endemicity, the hysteretic property of the
system (Fig. 4) implies that there is an opportunity for social planners
(i.e. the state, a livestock farming organization, or an integrating pri-
vate actor) to significantly improve disease control and, in turn, poultry
farmers’ welfare. Indeed, temporarily implementing a subsidized or
mandatory vaccination program or increasing the targeted penalties on
infected farms (through sanitary inspections and disease surveillance)
may incentivize fast depopulation of infected coops and establish a
disease-free equilibrium which is sustained in the long term, provided a
minimal targeted penalty is maintained. We did not consider the option
of mass culling accompanied with financial indemnities here as such a
policy can have the perverse effect of increasing the value of infected
flocks and, in turn, disincentivizing depopulation of infected farms and
increasing the number of coops with poultry (Boni et al., 2013). Era-
dication is not possible when endemicity is maintained through trade.
In this case, increasing the penalty, in the absence of affordable vaccine
technology, risks simultaneously increasing the FOI and lowering
farmer income, leading to higher costs for both the public health and
the poultry industry. Here, two options seem reasonable. One is en-
hancing sanitary inspections and/or biosecurity practices in the net-
work of traders (Moslonka-Lefebvre et al., 2016). A second is providing
farmers with an affordable vaccine technology in order to maintain
immunity in poultry populations and decrease the overall FOI.
Policymakers may encourage the creation of trustworthy and sustain-
able certification schemes ensuring that vaccinated birds are sold at
higher prices on the open market (Ifft et al., 2012).
Two assumptions on the epidemiology of HPAI were made in this
study. First, the possibility that a virus shed by an infected flock in the
farm compartment persists and infects a susceptible flock subsequently
introduced in the same coop was ignored (Paek et al., 2010). Second,
between-flock disease transmission in the trade compartment was not
taken into account, while it may occur in practice when poultry flocks
from different farms are mixed together in live bird markets (Fournie
et al., 2011). While these transmission pathways are possible, their
actual significance for the epidemiology of HPAI has not been clearly
documented in countries where HPAI is endemic. Further work would
be needed to assess the sensitivity of our results to these assumptions.
It was assumed here that farmers aim at maximizing an income flow
function in coops populated with poultry. A recent field study suggested
that poultry farmers’ decision making may be affected by altruistic
considerations and be influenced by other actors in the poultry value
chain (Delabouglise et al., 2016). Farmers are concerned with the
welfare of neighboring poultry farmers with whom they have social/
family connections. For this reason, they may be more inclined to de-
population than our model predicts, as depopulation would be per-
ceived as reducing local disease transmission. It was shown in Vietnam
that poultry farmers cooperate mostly with local feed and chick sup-
pliers to manage poultry diseases, partly because these actors sell feed
on credit to farmers, conferring them economic influence over their
customers (Delabouglise et al., 2015). Those chick suppliers might
perceive the depopulation behavior as advantageous for them as it in-
creases the demand for chicks and limits the local spread of the disease,
therefore preserving poultry production in their sale area.
The control of avian influenza – on smallholder farms, in markets,
and in trading networks – will remain on the global health agenda as
long as certain avian influenza subtypes continue exhibiting high
mortality in humans. Identifying the origin of these infections and
outbreaks is a critical component of their control. Understanding the
relationship between the microeconomics of poultry production and
microepidemiology of avian influenza transmission will allow us to
develop better tools for the control of avian influenza outbreaks in
smallholder poultry contexts.
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